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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
~TATJ<j

OF UTAH,

Plainti;ff-R espondent,

vs.

Case No.

CARLY LE A. SMITH,

10294

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Carlyle A. Smith, appeals from a con\ 1clinn of the crime of assault upon a child under the age
11 f 11 years, in violation of 76-7-9, Utah Code Annotated,
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried by jury trial in the District
\'ourt of San Juan County, State of Utah, for the crime
r-l1arged in the information. The jury returned a verdict
11
f guilty, and appellant was sentenced to be imprisoned in
the State Prison for a period not to exceed five years.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits the conviction should be aff'. ,
llllltr:.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 10th day of June, 1964, Lynette May, a six year
old child (T. 18), saw the appellant at Smith's Drug Store
in Moab, Utah (T. 6, 41). Ac-cording to the child, the appellant offered to give her some candy if she would come
down to his house (T. 10, 41). The appellant corroborate~
this in part (T. 41). The child testified as to the rout~
taken in going to the appellant's home. She rode ana
walked her bike with the appellant to his house (T. 7, 8).
After arriving at the appellant's home, the child stated
that the appellant told her to take off her pants, which
she did, and got on the bed. That, thereafter, the appellant
played with her private parts (T. 8). The appellant un·
zipped his pants and had the child rub his penis, and
asked the child to commit an act fellatio (T. 89). The chil1
then testified that she heard her mother honking and the
appellant instructed her to put on her pants. She went tu
the door which was locked, and her sister was knocking
1

at the door (T. 9).
The child's mother testified that she had authorized
her child to go for a few minutes to the appellant's house;
that after the child had been gone about fifteen minutes,
she went to the home, whi{;h was approximately two and
one-half blocks away from where the child and her mother
resided (T. 19). She knocked at the door of the appellant's
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tried to open the door, but it was locked. She
!!wn wm1t around to a window and looked in where she
s~i\\ Lynette and the appellant on the bed. The child had
r,c'l' pants down and the appellant had his hand on the
child's private parts, and the child had her hand on the appellant's sex organ (T. 20-21). She went out to the car
and wntinued to honk the horn while her other daughter
knotked on the door in an attempt to gain admittance (T.
)1,, 11 .,,.

:ind

21),

Subsequent to the event, that same day, Mrs. May confronted the appellant and the appellant admitted "petting
tile child a little" (T. 22). The appellant said at the time
uf trial that he meant a petting on the head or back (T.
46). The event occurred between 3 :00-4 :00 p.m. and Mrs.
!\fay called the police, after discussing the matter with her
husband, at approximately 7 :30 p.m. (T. 33). A deputy
sheriff testified that he could look from an outside window
nf the appellant's house into the bedroom and see the bed
Cl'. 38). The appellant admitted the presence of the child
in his home but denied taking indecent liberties (T. 41-48).
Subsequently, the trial court instructed the jury. No
exceptions to the instructions were taken by the appellant
IT. 52). After the jury had retired, they returned for
clarification of the court's instructions. Subsequently, the
iury returned again and the court again gave clarifying
instructions ( T. 53-55) . No exceptions were taken to any
of the instructions given by the court. Upon the above evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Further .facts
;yilJ be stated where relevant to the points argued.

4
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED
ITS DISCRETION IN LETTING LYNETTE
MAY TESTIFY.
The appellant contends that the trial court admitted
error in allowing Lynette May to testify. At the time shr
testified, she was seven years old (T. 16). Prior to her
testimony, the District Attorney interrogated Lynette in
the presence of the court, the appellant, and the appellant'i
counsel. She indicated where she lived, acknowledged that
she was in school in the second grade, who her teacher
was, and the names of her brothers and sisters (T. 3, 4).
Further, she indicated that she knew what it was to tell
the truth and knew what happened if she told a lie. She
acknowledged that she knew it was bad not to tell the truth,
that she attended Sunday School, acknowledged a belief in
God and that she intended to tell the truth. She understood
that if she testified falsely, she would be punished (T. 3-5).
Based upon the acknowledgments to the interrogation, the
trial court administered the oath. No objection was made
at any time to the testimony of Lynette May or to the ad·
ministration of the oath. During the course of her testl·
mony, she was responsive and graphic in her explanation
of what had occurred. Her testimony was greatly corrob·
orated by her mother's eyewitness account of the transac·
tion.

The appellant's position is that the court did not ex:
amine the child to ascertain whether she was capable ot
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ren:iving correct impressions and able to relay facts ac' urately. It is submitted that the appellant's position is
irithout merit.
At the outset, it is submitted that the appellant is in
no position to challenge the trial court's action since no
objection was raised at the time of trial. It is the general
rule that a person challenging the competency of a witness must object prior to the time the witness is sworn or
at least as soon as the incompetency of the witness is discovered. Abbott Criminal Triul Practice, 4th Ed. § 268.
If the appellant had felt that the trial court had acted improperly in allowing Lynette May to testify, it was incumlJent to raise the objection at the time of trial. The failnre to interpose any objection, indicates a waiver on the
pnrt of the appellant and further tends to support the conciusion that those who saw the witness and heard the re.;;ponse to her questions felt that there was no question as
Lo the child's competency.
It is well settled in Utah law that the question of the

cnmpetency of an infant witness is one within the sound
ciisvrrtion of the trial court and this court will not over1u!e the trial court's decision in an absence of a clear showing that the trial court abused its discretion. State v.
Blythe, 20 U. 379, 58 Pac. 1108 (1899); State v. Morasco,
42 U. 5, 128 Pac. 571 (1912); State v. McMillan, 46 U. 19,
140 Pac. 833 (1915); State v. Zeezich, 61 U. 61, 210 Pac.
927 (1922); State v. Williams, 111 U. 379, 180 P. 2d 551
\1947).

6

Contrary to the assertions in the appellant's brief, the
examination of the witness was not limited to her a~know].
edgments of a need to tell the truth. She was also examined
prior to being administered the oath on the question of her
relationship to her family, where she resided, and the grade
she was in in school - all of which tended to prove the
witness's ability to correctly relate facts.
In State v. Blythe, supra, the court indicated that i\
was proper in weighing whether or not the trial court had
abused its discretion in allowing a witness to testify, to
consider the testimony given during trial. In that case, the
court found that a six year old girl who was the victim of an
assault with intent to commit rape was a competent witness. The court stated:

"* * * The little girl testified distinctly to
acts, on the part of the defendant, tending to show
the commission of the offense eharged, and her evidence on material points, as appears from the tran·
script was corroborated by the testimony of other
witnesses. Under such circumstances the court was
warranted in submitting the case to the jury."
In State v. Morasco, supra, the questions asked and
approved by this court on appeal were very similar to those
asked in the instant case. The court ruled that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the witness
was competent to testify. In State v. McMillan, supra, this
court indieated that a child between age seven and eight
as was the witness in the instant case at the time of trial,
was competent to testify. In State v. Zeez~ch, supra, the
situation was extremely similar to that in the instant case.
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The appellant had been convicted of the same crime as the
instant appellant. The witness, an eight year old child, responded to questions in a manner similar to those posed in
the case now before the court. This court ruled that the
competency of the witness under such circumstances was
established and could not be set aside on appeal.
In State v. Williams, supra, this court found that the

competency of the witness was open to question, but indicated that the trial judge had the opportunity to see the
witness and to consider .factors which were obscure on appeal. The court ruled that under such circumstances it
could not say that the trial court had abused its discretion.
It is apparent, therefore, that under the circumstances provided in this case, the trial court properly allowed Lynette
May to testify.
l·
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY, UPON
THE JURY'S REQUEST, AFTER COMMENCING THEIR DELIBERATIONS.
The appellant contends that the trial court committed
error when, subsequent to the jury's commencing their
deliberations and after their having been originally instructed by the court, the jury returned requesting clarification. Contrary to the appellant's assertion on page 15
of his brief, there is nothing in the record which would
support a conclusion that when the jury requested additional instructions, that they had reached a verdict that

8
the appellant was guilty of simple assault (T. 53) R th
· a e1
when the jury first requested the assistance of the
'
court
the question that appeared to be in the jury's mind wa;
whether or not if they found the appellant guilty of in.
decent assault, they would have to also find the appellant
guilty of simple assault. The court indicated that the one
offense was included within the other and defined the 'w
'"~
offenses in accordance with its previous instructions. SuiJsequently, the jury returned again asking for clarificatiun
of the court's instruction that if the jury found or enteitained a reasonable doubt as to the degree of crime the
defendant had committed, that they should resolve the
doubt and find the defendant guilty of the lesser crime. At
no time did the court emphasize that the jury should reach
any particular finding. Indeed, the appellant's brief does
not pinpoint any particular error in the instructions. Further, no exception to the instructions was taken. It is well
established that before an appellant may claim error in the
instructions given by the trial court, exceptions must be
taken, 77-37-1, U. C. A., 1953.
In State v. Cooper, 114 U. 517, 207 P. 2d 764 (1949),
the defendant was convicted of the crime of indecent assault. The court concluded that in the absence of an exception having been taken to the court's instructions, the
appellant could not claim error on appeal. See also Sta/,
v. Anderson, 75 U. 496, 286 Pac. 645. In State v. Cobo. au
U. 89, 60 P. 2d 952, this court observed that it was a well
settled rule that in the absence of exceptions to instructioni,
. d on appea.1 H owever, the court·
error may not be cla1me
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ncitcd an exception where the instructions were palpably

erroneous, constituting manifest prejudice to the party
~g:grieved. In the instant case, the instructions demonstrate
no prror, let alone manifest error or palpable disregard for
the rights of the accused. As a consequence, the failure of
the ,1ppelbnt to take an exception to the instructions given
11•1 the court, precludes his claim of error on appeal.
In spite of the failu11e of appellant to take an exception, it is submitted that the instructions given were proper.
The court's expression of the definition of assault as lesser
included within the crime of indecent assault is a restatement of the statutory definition set forth in 76-7-1, U. C.
A, 1%3. In State v. Waid, 92 U. 297, 67 P. 2d 647, the
rr1urt determined that simple assault could be lesser included in the crime of indecent assault. Consequently, the
court was proper in ref erring to the definition of simple
a~sault so that the jury could understand the legal requirements the prosecution had to meet to convict of the lesser
offense. Further, since the manner and circumstances of
indecent assault need merely show an unlawful touching in
an indecent manner, State v. McMillan, supra, (see also
State v. Saunders, 82 U. 170, 22 P. 2d 1043; Russell Crime,
12th ed., vol. 1, p. 723), the court was correct in instructing
the jury that the nature of the assault required to convict
f0r inderent assault and that involved in simple assault
niav be different. See concurring opinion Wolfe, Justice,
State V. Waid, supra.
Finally, it should be noted that the questions which
thP iury asked were in no way inconsistent with their ulti-
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mate result. They were concerned first as to whether or
not there was a necessity to convict on both simple assault
and indecent assault and secondly, how they should a<:t if
there was any doubt in their minds concerning the offense
committed. The instructions of the court obviously cleared
the confusion that existed in the jury's mind enabling thetn
to bring in a verdict swiftly. It is apparent, therefore, that
the trial court's oral instructions in no way coerced the
jury into rendering a particular verdict, but merely prop.
erly apprised them of the law in such a manner that they
were able to apply the facts and reach a verdict. There is
no error on this point.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT.
The evidence in the instant case is more than ample
to sustain the jury's verdict. It is comparable to the evi·
dence found sufficient in other cases by this court, State
v. Saunders, supra; State v. Cooper, supra. The facts,
when viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
disclose that the appellant lured a small child to his home
with the promise of candy. That, thereafter, he caused
the child to disrobe and fondled her private parts and in·
duced the child to reciprocate. The child's mother viewed
the appellant while performing the indecent act. The ap·
pellant made admissions that he petted the child. The po·
lice were called after the child's mother had consulted her
husband. The testimony of the child as to the door being
locked was corroborated by the mother's testimony. A
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deputy sheriff indicated that it was possible to see through
a window from the side of the house into the bedroom, thus
supporting Mrs. May's testimony. The jury had full opportunity to view the evidence, including the appellant's protestations of innocence. They resolved the issue in favor
of the appellant's guilt. There is sufficient evidence to
prove the elements of the crime and to sustain the jury's
verdict. The decision should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The facts in the instant case amply demonstrate that
the jury acted properly in finding the appellant guilty of
the crime charged. The legal claims of error upon which
the appellant relies for reversal are wholly without merit.
The court's oral instructions were in no way offensive.
When it is considered that no exception was taken and that
the jury had the otherwise unassailed written instructions
of the court also to guide them, it is obvious there is no
merit to the claim of instructional error. Further, a simple perusal of the record makes it manifest that the court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing a child, who is a
victim of the offense, to testify. This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN,
Attorney General,
RONALD N. BOYCE,
Chief Assistant
Attorney General,
State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah,
Attorneys for Respondent.

